The claim
A complete, dispatchable freeze packet in under sixty seconds, measured against the same task on the live portal.
What this does not claim
It does not freeze anyone’s money. There is no bank integration and no CFCFRMS connection. Nothing sent here reaches a bank, a police force, or any government system. It is a prototype of a sequence, not a replacement for one — and the sequence is the argument.
Measured
Every recorded human run from first interaction to dispatch, unfiltered. The median includes the slow ones; a best-case number would not mean anything. Demo replays are counted separately and excluded — they serve a cached extraction and start their clock at the fixture click, so they measure review time, not the task.
Median
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Fastest
—
Slowest
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Under 60s
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Not yet measured. No human run has been recorded, so the sixty-second claim above is unproven. It stays unproven here rather than being filled in with demo replays — the same rule this page applies to the portal column below, applied to our own headline number.
Compared
The same task on cybercrime.gov.in. These numbers are counted by hand — nothing here is estimated or generated.
Not counted, and not guessed. The portal column is empty because nobody has opened the live portal and counted it. We tried the documentary route first: the portal’s own citizen manuals do not enumerate this form — the financial-fraud one covers the 1930 helpline route and is marked “For Delhi Only”, and the general reporting manual is a deck of screenshots with no text layer.
Counting fields off screenshots of a different form would be inference. So this stays empty. We could not measure this is a fine thing to show you; we guessed is not.
Fields required before the first submission
- cybercrime.gov.in
- not yet counted
- Golden Hour
- 0
No field blocks dispatch. A packet with holes is sent as a packet with holes.
Fields collected before the first submission
- cybercrime.gov.in
- not yet counted
- Golden Hour
- 9
The nine freeze fields in FREEZE_FIELDS, most of them lifted off a screenshot.
Screens before the first submission
- cybercrime.gov.in
- not yet counted
- Golden Hour
- 2
Intake, then confirm.
Account registration or OTP required first
- cybercrime.gov.in
- not yet counted
- Golden Hour
- No
An OTP is a delay, and on a phone with a live screen-share it is a hazard.
Median seconds to first submission
- cybercrime.gov.in
- not yet counted
- Golden Hour
- see measured
Measured live from real runs — see the measured section of /evidence.
Must the user classify the fraud themselves first
- cybercrime.gov.in
- not yet counted
- Golden Hour
- No
The category is inferred from what they wrote. It is never asked.
The sequence already exists
The strongest evidence for this product’s argument is that the government already runs it — on the phone, just not on the web.
The portal’s own instructions for reporting a financial cyber fraud through 1930 describe a two-part sequence. A short list of facts first — mobile number, bank or wallet, the account or UPI ID debited, transaction ID, transaction date, card number where relevant, a screenshot if there is one. Then:
“the complainant will get a system generated Log-in Id/acknowledgement number through SMS/Mail. Using the above Log-in Id/acknowledgement number, the complainant must complete registration of complaint on National Cybercrime Reporting Portal (www.cybercrime.gov.in) within 24 hours.”
Minimal packet, acknowledgement number, full statement afterwards against that number. That is exactly the re-sequencing this prototype argues for, and it is already official procedure for the helpline. Golden Hour’s claim is only that the web route should work the same way.
Citizen Financial Cyber Frauds Reporting and Management System — MHA / I4C. Marked “For Delhi Only”, which is a limit of the document, not of the argument.
The clock
The meter shows how long ago the fraud happened, counted from the timestamp the user gave us and never from when the page loaded. It does not show a recovery percentage, and the reason is worth stating in full.
There is no published recovery curve, so we do not draw one. An earlier version of this meter showed a falling percentage — 50% within an hour, 10% within a day, 2% after a week — taken from the project brief. Those figures could not be traced to any primary source.
In Rajya Sabha Unstarred Question 1349 of 11 February 2026, the Ministry of Home Affairs was asked for “details of total amount recovered vis-à-vis losses incurred, year-wise”. The answer does not contain the word recovered. The percentages that circulate in the press are police statements, not published statistics.
A decaying counter whose number nobody can source is urgency theatre — the exact thing this product claims not to be. So the number is gone and the clock stayed. The direction is real and sourced; the magnitude is not claimed.
What is cited, and for what
- MHA, Rajya Sabha Unstarred Question 1349, 11 February 2026
CFCFRMS was launched in 2021 “for immediate reporting of financial frauds and to stop siphoning off funds by the fraudsters”. Till 31.12.2025 more than Rs 8,189 crore was saved across more than 23.61 lakh complaints. The same answer was asked for amounts recovered against losses and does not give them.